Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    A strictly dominated strategy will never be rational unde... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    A strictly dominated strategy will never be rational under any epistemic model for a game.

    Moral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If a strategy is strictly dominated, it remains strictly dominated even when the player receives more information about opponents' strategies.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If a strategy is strictly dominated with respect to the entire set of opponents' strategies, there are no beliefs a player can hold that would make that strategy rational.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rationality is agent-relative: what counts as rational depends on the agent's actual belief-formation process, not idealized Bayesian updating.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.An agent with systematically non-standard priors (e.g., lexicographic preferences per Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel 1991) may assign probability zero to certain opponent strategies, making a 'strictly dominated' strategy locally optimal.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If the epistemic model presupposes common knowledge of rationality, it smuggles in the conclusion, making the claim circular rather than a genuine constraint on rational play.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Strict dominance is defined relative to a fixed strategy space, but bounded rationality (Simon 1955) entails agents may not correctly represent or enumerate that full space.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If an agent's cognitive model of the game omits strategies that would dominate their chosen action, the dominated strategy is rational relative to the agent's actual epistemic situation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    An agent with systematically non-standard priors (e.g., lexicographic preference...If a strategy is strictly dominated with respect to the entire set of opponents'...If a strategy is strictly dominated, it remains strictly dominated even when the...If an agent's cognitive model of the game omits strategies that would dominate t...
    +3 moreShow less
    If the epistemic model presupposes common knowledge of rationality, it smuggles ...Rationality is agent-relative: what counts as rational depends on the agent's ac...Strict dominance is defined relative to a fixed strategy space, but bounded rati...

    Similar

    If a strategy is strictly dominated with respect to the entire set of ...89%A rational player does not choose strictly dominated strategies.85%Rational players with common belief in rationality will choose iterati...85%If a strategy is strictly dominated, it remains strictly dominated eve...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: epistemic-game
    View source passageHide passage
    If a strategy is strictly dominated, it remains so if the player gets more information about what her opponents (might) do. Thus, if a strategy \(s_i\) is strictly dominated in a game \(G\) with respect to the entire set of her opponents’ strategies \(S_{-i}\), then it will never be rational (according to the above definitions) in any epistemic (-plausibility) model for \(G\). I.e., there are no beliefs player \(i\) can have that makes \(s_i\) rational. The same observation does not hold for wea
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit