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    A thing does not have of itself that which can be lost wi... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Supports→Bodies do not possess motion essentially (motion is not intrinsic to bodies)

    A thing does not have of itself that which can be lost without ceasing to be what it is

    CausationModality & Possibility
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    Bodies are able to lose their motion without ceasing to be bodiesBodies do not possess motion essentially (motion is not intrinsic to bodies)

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    A thing does not cease to be original merely because it is resoluble i...76%If something cannot be different from what it is, it necessarily is th...75%A thing cannot both be and not be the intrinsic substantial form of a ...74%Treating the thing-in-itself as a distinct object is misconstrued.74%

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    SEP: cordemoy
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    Cordemoy’s argument for occasionalism with regard to body-body interaction appears in the Fourth Discourse of the Discernement (he will later expand his occasionalism to cover all ‘interaction’ in the created world). There we are given a series of definitions and axioms, and conclusions derived from these. Cordemoy begins by asserting as axioms (1) a thing does not have of itself (de soy) that which can be lost without ceasing to be what it is, and (2) bodies are able to lose their motion withou

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