A view that denies transcendentally mind-independent substrata cannot satisfy Kant's criterion for grounding temporal self-location, as Allison argues in 'Kant's Transcendental Idealism'.
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Something that exists completely separately from anyone's thoughts or perceptions—it doesn't depend on being observed or thought about by any mind.
criterion(as used in philosophy to describe a test for whether an idea works)
A standard or rule used to decide whether something counts as true or valid.
substrata(Armstrong's ontology posits substrata as that which underlies and supports properties)
Non-property particulars that, on Armstrong's view, properties depend upon in order to exist — the bearers or subjects that 'have' properties
transcendental idealism(Kant's own label for his philosophical position)
The position that the main forms of objects (spatiality, temporality, substantiality, causality, etc.) are imposed by the subject upon experience and therefore cannot be regarded as real forms of objects independent of our representations, while nonetheless maintaining that both selves and objects really exist independently of our representations of them.