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    Identity phenomenalism is incompatible with Kant's argume... — Carmelics
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    Identity phenomenalism is incompatible with Kant's argument in the Refutation of Idealism

    Personal Identity
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's Refutation requires that outer objects serving as the permanent substratum of time-determination are mind-independent in the transcendental sense.
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    • 2.Identity phenomenalism, following Berkeley, identifies outer objects with bundles of representations, denying any mind-independent substratum.
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    • 3.A view that denies transcendentally mind-independent substrata cannot satisfy Kant's criterion for grounding temporal self-location, as Allison argues in 'Kant's Transcendental Idealism'.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kant's notion of permanence in B278 requires that what is permanent endures through time independently of any particular act of apprehension.
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    • 2.On identity phenomenalism, as articulated by Falkenstein and criticized by Langton, representations are inherently episodic and dependent on being apprehended.
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    • 3.No collection of inherently episodic, apprehension-dependent entities can constitute the kind of enduring, non-episodic permanent that Kant's transcendental argument structurally demands.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Kant argues that self-consciousness requires the existence of permanent objects in space
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    • 2.There is no permanent representation in the mind (B278)
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    • 3.If objects just are representations, then none of the objects are permanent
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    3 topics

    Perception3 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A position that entails no permanent objects exist contradicts the requirement t...A view that denies transcendentally mind-independent substrata cannot satisfy Ka...Identity phenomenalism, following Berkeley, identifies outer objects with bundle...If objects just are representations, then none of the objects are permanent
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    Kant argues that self-consciousness requires the existence of permanent objects ...Kant's Refutation requires that outer objects serving as the permanent substratu...

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    SEP: kant-transcendental-idealism
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    Nothing about this conclusion, or how Kant argues for it, is prima facie incompatible with a qualified phenomenalist reading of transcendental idealism, or even a strong phenomenalist one.[21] It may be incompatible with “identity” phenomenalism, since Kant argues that self-consciousness requires the existence of permanent objects in space, yet there is no permanent representation in the mind (B278). If objects just are representations, it follows that none of them are permanent.[22] At B274
    Extraction notes

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    Details

    Kant's notion of permanence in B278 requires that what is permanent endures thro...
    No collection of inherently episodic, apprehension-dependent entities can consti...
    On identity phenomenalism, as articulated by Falkenstein and criticized by Langt...
    There is no permanent representation in the mind (B278)
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit