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    A view that retains a distinct acquaintance requirement i... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable relation is necessary—is a plausible reply that does not collapse into phenomenal conservatism.

    A view that retains a distinct acquaintance requirement is not equivalent to phenomenal conservatism even if it shares structural features with it.

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    Acquaintance with a probability maker (and possibly with the relation of making ...Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable ...Unlike phenomenal conservatism, the proposal still requires acquaintance with so...

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    Unlike phenomenal conservatism, the proposal still requires acquaintan...78%A view too similar to phenomenal conservatism fails to offer a distinc...76%If the making-probable relation is necessary, the proposal has too muc...74%Like Russell, contemporary acquaintance theorists hold that all knowle...73%

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    Tucker (2016) presents a dilemma for this proposal: Either the relevant making probable relation is contingent, or it is necessary. If it is contingent, then the justification will be inferential, and so the principle can’t account for misleading noninferential justification. If it is necessary, then (like (2)), the principle has too much in common with phenomenal conservatism to be attractive from the point of view of classical foundationalism. A plausible reply would grasp the second horn: Unl

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