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    Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting th... — Carmelics
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    Grasping the second horn of Tucker's dilemma—accepting that the making-probable relation is necessary—is a plausible reply that does not collapse into phenomenal conservatism.

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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Unlike phenomenal conservatism, the proposal still requires acquaintance with something epistemically relevant to the target proposition.
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    • 2.Acquaintance with a probability maker (and possibly with the relation of making probable) is a substantive epistemic requirement absent in bare phenomenal conservatism.
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    • 3.A view that retains a distinct acquaintance requirement is not equivalent to phenomenal conservatism even if it shares structural features with it.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.If acquaintance with a probability-maker suffices for justification, the view inherits phenomenal conservatism's permissiveness toward any internally coherent but misleading seeming.
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    • 2.The making-probable relation, if grasped via acquaintance alone, reduces epistemic work to phenomenal accessibility, collapsing the structural distinction Tucker's dilemma was meant to preserve.
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    • 3.Conee and Feldman's evidentialist framework shows that acquaintance-based probability relations face the same generality problem as phenomenal states: which relation, under which individuation, counts?
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Requiring acquaintance with both a probability-maker and the making-probable relation generates a vicious regress, since acquaintance with the relation itself demands further epistemic grounding per Sellars's critique of the given.
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    • 2.If the making-probable relation is a brute given of acquaintance, then the view is structurally identical to Pryor's dogmatism, which Fumerton's acquaintance theory was explicitly designed to surpass.
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    Related

    A view that retains a distinct acquaintance requirement is not equivalent to phe...Acquaintance with a probability maker (and possibly with the relation of making ...Conee and Feldman's evidentialist framework shows that acquaintance-based probab...If acquaintance with a probability-maker suffices for justification, the view in...
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    If the making-probable relation is a brute given of acquaintance, then the view ...Requiring acquaintance with both a probability-maker and the making-probable rel...The making-probable relation, if grasped via acquaintance alone, reduces epistem...Unlike phenomenal conservatism, the proposal still requires acquaintance with so...

    Similar

    If the making-probable relation is necessary, the proposal has too muc...82%A necessary making-probable relation functions similarly to the necess...82%Premise P6, which rules out circular arguments, is part of the second ...78%Ramsey's objections to perceiving relations of making-probable are wea...77%

    Source

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    SEP: knowledge-acquaindescrip
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    Tucker (2016) presents a dilemma for this proposal: Either the relevant making probable relation is contingent, or it is necessary. If it is contingent, then the justification will be inferential, and so the principle can’t account for misleading noninferential justification. If it is necessary, then (like (2)), the principle has too much in common with phenomenal conservatism to be attractive from the point of view of classical foundationalism. A plausible reply would grasp the second horn: Unl
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit