Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) demonstrated that equilibria ... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→A cooperative equilibrium exists in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas for sufficiently memory-constrained players

    Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) demonstrated that equilibria in automata-played games depend on complexity costs, which the original claim treats as absent.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consequentialism1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    A cooperative equilibrium exists in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas for su...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Explore a random proposition
    Start fresh with something unrelated.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective