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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    A cooperative equilibrium exists in finitely repeated pri... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    A cooperative equilibrium exists in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas for sufficiently memory-constrained players

    ConsequentialismModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Cooperation is impossible in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas under standard assumptions
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    • 2.For finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas, finite automata players whose number of states is less than exponential in the number of rounds can sustain a cooperative equilibrium
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Memory constraints imposed externally on players alter the game's constitutive rules, not merely the players' strategies within those rules.
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    • 2.A cooperative equilibrium sustained only by architectural incapacity to defect is not a genuine equilibrium but a constrained optimum under a different game.
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    • 3.Binmore's critique of bounded rationality holds that rationality norms apply to the idealized game, not to cognitively crippled proxies of the original agents.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) demonstrated that equilibria in automata-played games depend on complexity costs, which the original claim treats as absent.
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    • 2.Without complexity costs penalizing larger automata, players have incentive to expand state-space and defect near terminal rounds, unraveling the cooperative equilibrium via backward induction.
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    • 3.The cooperative result therefore holds only under an auxiliary assumption about complexity costs that is neither stated in the claim nor derivable from memory-constraint alone.
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    Modality & PossibilityConsequentialism

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    Related

    A cooperative equilibrium sustained only by architectural incapacity to defect i...Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) demonstrated that equilibria in automata-played game...Binmore's critique of bounded rationality holds that rationality norms apply to ...Cooperation is impossible in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas under stand...
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    For finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas, finite automata players whose number ...Memory constraints imposed externally on players alter the game's constitutive r...The cooperative result therefore holds only under an auxiliary assumption about ...Without complexity costs penalizing larger automata, players have incentive to e...

    Similar

    For finitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas, finite automata players who...89%Cooperation is impossible in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas u...79%Isolated cooperators and small groups of cooperators (fewer than four)...77%Miscommunication causes repeated-game cooperative equilibria to unrave...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: bounded-rationality
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    Since tit-for-tat is a very simple strategy, computationally, one can begin to explore a notion of rationality that emerges in a group of boundedly rational agents and even see evidence of those bounds contributing to the emergence of pro-social norms. Rubinstein (Rubinstein 1986) studied finite automata which play repeated prisoner’s dilemmas and whose aims are to maximize average payoff while minimizing the number of states of a machine. Finite automata capture regular languages, the lowest-le
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit