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    Accepting the explanatory demand is therefore compatible ... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Challenges→Generalism about reasons is not supported by the demand that differing valences of a feature across cases must be explained.

    Accepting the explanatory demand is therefore compatible with particularism about reasons.

    Moral Responsibility
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    SEP: moral-particularism
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    The second prong of the particularist attack is to ask why we should suppose that a feature that counts in favour in one case must count the same way wherever it appears. To this question, I think, no real answer has been produced. Generalists tend to point out that if one claims that a feature counts in favour here and against there, one has something to explain. But the particularist is happy to admit this. It is true that if a feature counts in favour in one case and against in another broadl

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