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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Generalism about reasons is not supported by the demand t... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Generalism about reasons is not supported by the demand that differing valences of a feature across cases must be explained.

    Moral Responsibility
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Jonathan Dancy's 'holism about reasons' shows a feature's valence depends on surrounding features, not on any standalone universal principle.
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    • 2.If holism is true, explanations of valence-shifts cite local enabling/disabling conditions, making appeal to exceptionless generalizations explanatorily idle.
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    • 3.An explanation is idle when removing it leaves the explanandum equally well accounted for, so generalism earns no support from the explanatory demand.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that citing a rule does not itself settle how it applies without further interpretive context.
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    • 2.If rules cannot self-apply, then positing universal principles governing reason-valence shifts the explanatory burden rather than discharging it.
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    • 3.The explanatory demand is therefore satisfied by contextual narrative accounts without requiring the kind of exceptionless principles generalism posits.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Particularists accept that differing valences of a feature across cases require explanation.
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    • 2.The required explanations appeal to contextual differences between cases, not to universal principles governing how features function as reasons.
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    • 3.Accepting the explanatory demand is therefore compatible with particularism about reasons.
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    Topics

    Moral Responsibility

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Accepting the explanatory demand is therefore compatible with particularism abou...An explanation is idle when removing it leaves the explanandum equally well acco...If holism is true, explanations of valence-shifts cite local enabling/disabling ...If rules cannot self-apply, then positing universal principles governing reason-...
    +5 moreShow less
    Jonathan Dancy's 'holism about reasons' shows a feature's valence depends on sur...Particularists accept that differing valences of a feature across cases require ...The explanatory demand is therefore satisfied by contextual narrative accounts w...The required explanations appeal to contextual differences between cases, not to...Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations show that citing a rule does not it...

    Similar

    Particularists accept that differing valences of a feature across case...90%The availability of case-by-case explanations for why a feature counts...87%The required explanations appeal to contextual differences between cas...86%When a feature counts in favour in one case and against in another bro...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: moral-particularism
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    The second prong of the particularist attack is to ask why we should suppose that a feature that counts in favour in one case must count the same way wherever it appears. To this question, I think, no real answer has been produced. Generalists tend to point out that if one claims that a feature counts in favour here and against there, one has something to explain. But the particularist is happy to admit this. It is true that if a feature counts in favour in one case and against in another broadl
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit