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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Agent-relative consequentialism can account for the duties of friendship

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Friendship duties arise from a relationship of partial concern, not from maximizing weighted outcomes — even agent-relative ones.
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    • 2.Bernard Williams argued that consequentialist frameworks, even modified ones, undermine integrity by reducing personal commitments to impersonal calculations.
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    • 3.A friend who helps because it maximizes agent-relative value is not acting as a friend but as a self-interested optimizer, corrupting the constitutive norms of friendship.
      ?

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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Agent-relative weighting is stipulated post hoc to match friendship intuitions, making the resulting theory descriptively adequate but explanatorily empty.
      ?

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    • 2.Deontological accounts ground friendship duties in promissory, historical, or relational obligations that are categorically binding, not merely heavily weighted considerations.
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    • 3.A framework that can accommodate any intuition by adjusting weights lacks the normative structure needed to genuinely explain why friendship duties bind agents.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Agent-relative consequentialists can assign more weight to the welfare of a friend of an agent when assessing the value of the consequences of that agent's acts
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    • 2.Common moral intuitions hold that friends have special duties toward one another
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