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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Agent-relative obligations require both intention and action (causation) to constitute human agency, not either alone.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Doctrine of Double Effect, as developed by Aquinas and refined by Foot and Thomson, already separates foreseen-but-unintended consequences from intended ones without requiring action.
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    • 2.An agent who sincerely intends to kill an innocent person but is physically prevented violates the same moral norm as one who succeeds, since the will's corruption is complete at the moment of settled intention.
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    • 3.Therefore, intention alone is sufficient to ground agent-relative obligation, since moral culpability attaches to the corrupt will, not the causal history that follows from it.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré's causal responsibility framework demonstrates that negligent causation does carry genuine moral weight distinct from mere bad luck, undermining P1's dismissal of negligent killings.
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    • 2.If negligent killings can be graded by degree of deviation from due care, as tort law and common moral practice confirm, then action-based obligations need not be overbroad but can be indexed to culpable risk-imposition.
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    • 3.The supporting argument's P3 therefore presents a false dilemma, since a refined action-based account avoids overbreadth without requiring the conjunctive intention-plus-action standard.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If agent-relative obligations were based on action alone (e.g., not to kill), then merely negligent killings would breach those obligations and warrant serious blame for violating a categorical norm.
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    • 2.If agent-relative obligations were based on intention alone (e.g., not to intend to kill), then forming such an intention for good consequences when one cannot act on it would be impermissible.
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    • 3.Neither of these consequences (overbroad obligation via action alone or overbroad obligation via intention alone) is acceptable.
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