If agent-relative obligations were based on intention alone (e.g., not to intend to kill), then forming such an intention for good consequences when one cannot act on it would be impermissible.
A deliberate plan or purpose that someone has in mind when they do something.
obligation(Within obligational disputation)
The respondent's commitment to a specific stance on the case put forward by the opponent, which governs how the respondent must respond to subsequent propositions throughout the disputation.
By requiring both intention and causings to constitute human agency, this third view avoids the seeming overbreadth of our obligations if either intention or action alone marked such agency. Suppose our agent-relative obligation were not to do some action such as kill an innocent –is that obligation breached by a merely negligent killing, so that we deserve the serious blame of having breached such a categorical norm (Hurd 1994)? (Of course, one might be somewhat blameworthy on consequentialist