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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    321,452
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    42
    Agents cannot avoid incurring an obligation to perform an... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Agents cannot avoid incurring an obligation to perform an action simply because they intend to perform that action poorly

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Moral obligations are grounded in what agents are capable of doing, not in what they privately intend to do (Kant's perfect duties apply regardless of maxims).
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    • 2.Allowing intention to nullify obligation would let any agent escape moral requirements by simply resolving in advance to act wrongly, producing a reductio of the escape route.
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    • 3.Frankfurt's work on will and action confirms that intentions are revisable up to execution, so no prior bad intention can settle what one is obligated to do.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotelian virtue ethics holds that obligations track what the virtuous agent would do in one's circumstances, a standard external to any particular agent's motivational set.
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    • 2.An agent's vicious disposition is itself a moral failing that generates rather than extinguishes obligations, since Aristotle treats voluntary character formation as responsibility-conferring.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.An agent's intention to behave badly does not change the moral requirements that apply to the agent
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    • 2.Being disposed to do wrong does not allow one to avoid incurring obligations to do good
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    Allowing intention to nullify obligation would let any agent escape moral requir...An agent's intention to behave badly does not change the moral requirements that...An agent's vicious disposition is itself a moral failing that generates rather t...Aristotelian virtue ethics holds that obligations track what the virtuous agent ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Being disposed to do wrong does not allow one to avoid incurring obligations to ...Frankfurt's work on will and action confirms that intentions are revisable up to...Moral obligations are grounded in what agents are capable of doing, not in what ...

    Similar

    Being disposed to do wrong does not allow one to avoid incurring oblig...83%Possibilism can generate obligations that, if acted on, would result i...80%Moral obligations must be such that someone who violates a moral oblig...80%An action that requires violating a duty to oneself is morally impermi...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: actualism-possibilism-ethics
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    Goldman’s (G*1) and Sobel’s (S) enjoy the theoretical and practical virtue of simplicity by prescribing a single obligatory act sequence at a time rather than multiple, jointly unfulfillable prescriptions at a time. But this theoretical virtue comes at the cost of a possibilist objection: their views allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations simply in virtue of having an imperfect moral character, and this allows agents to, morally speaking, get off the hook too easily (Jackson &
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit