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    Agents trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma are stuck in the i... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Agents trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma are stuck in the inefficient outcome due to the logic of their situation, not their psychology

    ConsequentialismMoral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by a payoff structure, not by the psychological dispositions of the agents
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    • 2.If agents are genuinely in a Prisoner's Dilemma payoff structure, the dominant strategy logic applies regardless of their attitudes toward each other
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Amartya Sen's 'isolation paradox' shows agents with rank-ordered preferences over others' outcomes can transform the payoff structure itself.
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    • 2.If sympathy or commitment (Sen 1977) alters an agent's utility function, the game they are actually playing is no longer a Prisoner's Dilemma.
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    • 3.Therefore, the 'logic of the situation' presupposes a psychological stipulation—self-interested preference ordering—that is doing the explanatory work.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.David Gauthier argues in 'Morals by Agreement' that agents who are transparent and disposed to conditional cooperation can rationally defect from standard dominance reasoning.
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    • 2.If constrained maximizers can achieve cooperative outcomes within the same payoff matrix, the inefficient outcome follows from a specific psychological assumption, not situational logic alone.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

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    Causation2 linked

    Related

    Amartya Sen's 'isolation paradox' shows agents with rank-ordered preferences ove...David Gauthier argues in 'Morals by Agreement' that agents who are transparent a...If agents are genuinely in a Prisoner's Dilemma payoff structure, the dominant s...If constrained maximizers can achieve cooperative outcomes within the same payof...
    +3 moreShow less
    If sympathy or commitment (Sen 1977) alters an agent's utility function, the gam...The Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by a payoff structure, not by the psychologica...Therefore, the 'logic of the situation' presupposes a psychological stipulation—...

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    To return to our prisoners, suppose that, contrary to our assumptions, they do value each other’s well-being as well as their own. In that case, this must be reflected in their utility functions, and hence in their payoffs. If their payoff structures are changed so that, for example, they would feel so badly about contributing to inefficiency that they’d rather spend extra years in prison than endure the shame, then they will no longer be in a PD. But all this shows is that not every possible si
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit