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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Agents who wish to avoid Prisoner's Dilemma-style ineffic... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Agents who wish to avoid Prisoner's Dilemma-style inefficient outcomes should prevent such games from arising rather than attempting to reason their way out while in them

    ConsequentialismVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma traps agents in inefficient outcomes once they are in the relevant payoff structure
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    • 2.Changing one's reasoning strategy from within the game does not alter the underlying payoff structure
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma play demonstrates that tit-for-tat and similar strategies produce cooperative equilibria without altering the payoff structure.
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    • 2.Axelrod's tournaments show that reasoning strategies like conditional cooperation can escape defection traps from within the game itself.
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    • 3.The claim conflates single-shot and iterated games, rendering its conclusion overstated for the most common real-world contexts.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Derek Parfit's 'resolute chooser' and Gauthier's constrained maximization show that agents who pre-commit to cooperative dispositions alter effective outcomes without escaping the game.
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    • 2.A disposition to cooperate, if mutually recognized, transforms the rational calculus agents face even under the original payoff matrix.
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Moral Responsibility2 linked

    Related

    A disposition to cooperate, if mutually recognized, transforms the rational calc...Axelrod's tournaments show that reasoning strategies like conditional cooperatio...Changing one's reasoning strategy from within the game does not alter the underl...Derek Parfit's 'resolute chooser' and Gauthier's constrained maximization show t...
    +3 moreShow less
    Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma play demonstrates that tit-for-tat and similar strat...The claim conflates single-shot and iterated games, rendering its conclusion ove...The logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma traps agents in inefficient outcomes once th...

    Similar

    Agents trapped in a Prisoner's Dilemma are stuck in the inefficient ou...72%There is no compelling reason to expect players to choose NE, SPE, or ...71%Mutual confession is the solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the ...70%Misidentifying a coordination game as a PD leads to applying the wrong...70%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    To return to our prisoners, suppose that, contrary to our assumptions, they do value each other’s well-being as well as their own. In that case, this must be reflected in their utility functions, and hence in their payoffs. If their payoff structures are changed so that, for example, they would feel so badly about contributing to inefficiency that they’d rather spend extra years in prison than endure the shame, then they will no longer be in a PD. But all this shows is that not every possible si
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit