An explanatory gap that is simply declared closed by fiat rather than illuminated by the identity leaves the hard problem structurally intact, as Chalmers argues the conceivability of distinct realizers persists.
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The physical or concrete things that make up or create an abstract property—for example, neurons and their activity are realizers of the thought 'I'm hungry.'
The hard problem(philosophy of mind)
A famous puzzle in philosophy asking why physical processes in the brain produce subjective conscious experience at all, rather than just happening 'in the dark' without feeling like anything.
conceivability(Qualified as 'properly circumscribed' to distinguish it from naive or unreflective conceivability)
The ability to coherently imagine or suppose a state of affairs without contradiction
explanatory gap(Central concept in anti-physicalist arguments)
The alleged in-principle inability to intelligibly explain how consciousness arises from physical processes