Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    The explanatory gap problem is dissolved if the conscious... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The explanatory gap problem is dissolved if the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are identical.

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are identical, then the neural property does not cause or give rise to the conscious qualitative property — it simply is the conscious qualitative property.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If there is no causal relation between the neural property and the conscious qualitative property, there is no gap to bridge and no further explanation is needed.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Identities cannot be explained, since nothing is identical with anything but itself, and it makes no sense to ask why something is identical with itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Identity statements between phenomenal and neural properties require justification, and 'type-B' physicalists like Levine argue the conceivability of zombies shows the identity is not knowable a priori.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the identity itself is a brute, unexplained posit, the explanatory gap is merely relocated to why this particular identity holds rather than dissolved.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.An explanatory gap that is simply declared closed by fiat rather than illuminated by the identity leaves the hard problem structurally intact, as Chalmers argues the conceivability of distinct realizers persists.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal argument establishes that if pain and C-fiber firing are genuinely identical, the identity is necessary, yet we can coherently conceive of pain without C-fiber firing, unlike paradigm theoretical identities like water and H2O.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The appearance of contingency in phenomenal-neural identities cannot be explained away by appealing to the reference-fixing of phenomenal terms, since phenomenal properties are directly acquainted rather than picked out via description.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore the identity either fails or remains metaphysically unintelligible in a way that heat-kinetic energy identities do not, meaning the explanatory gap re-emerges at the modal level.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Related

    An explanatory gap that is simply declared closed by fiat rather than illuminate...Identities cannot be explained, since nothing is identical with anything but its...Identity statements between phenomenal and neural properties require justificati...If the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are identical, the...
    +5 moreShow less
    If the identity itself is a brute, unexplained posit, the explanatory gap is mer...If there is no causal relation between the neural property and the conscious qua...Kripke's modal argument establishes that if pain and C-fiber firing are genuinel...The appearance of contingency in phenomenal-neural identities cannot be explaine...Therefore the identity either fails or remains metaphysically unintelligible in ...

    Similar

    The explanatory gap problem asks how neural properties cause or give r...93%If qualia are identical to neural properties, the explanatory gap does...86%If there is no causal relation between the neural property and the con...85%If the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are iden...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: consciousness
    View source passageHide passage
    Nonetheless the type-type identity theory has enjoyed a recent if modest resurgence at least with respect to qualia or qualitative conscious properties. This has been in part because treating the relevant psycho-physical link as an identity is thought by some to offer a way of dissolving the explanatory gap problem (Hill and McLaughlin 1998, Papineau 1995, 2003). They argue that if the conscious qualitative property and the neural property are identical, then there is no need to explain how the
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit