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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that An external enforcer such as NATO would not have resolved the Yugoslav or Rwandan conflicts if those conflicts were coordination games rather than Prisoner's Dilemmas.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Coordination games with multiple equilibria require a focal point mechanism, which an external enforcer can uniquely provide through recognized authority.
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    • 2.Schelling's analysis shows that salient third-party interventions reframe expectation structures, shifting which equilibrium actors converge upon.
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    • 3.NATO's credible presence in Yugoslavia demonstrably altered actor expectations, producing the Dayton equilibrium that internal coordination had failed to generate.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The classification of Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts as coordination games rather than Prisoner's Dilemmas is itself empirically contested and theoretically underdetermined.
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    • 2.Wendt and constructivist IR theorists argue that conflict game-structures are not fixed prior to intervention but are constituted through the process of external engagement itself.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.In a Hobbesian analysis, an external enforcer resolves conflict by threatening parties with outcomes worse than non-cooperation.
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    • 2.If the conflicts were coordination games, each side already feared from the other something worse than any external enforcer could threaten.
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    • 3.Therefore, the mere presence of an external enforcer could not have changed the game or the incentive structure.
      ?

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.