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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    An external enforcer such as NATO would not have resolved... — Carmelics
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    Home/Justice & Punishment
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    An external enforcer such as NATO would not have resolved the Yugoslav or Rwandan conflicts if those conflicts were coordination games rather than Prisoner's Dilemmas.

    Democracy & GovernanceJustice & Punishment
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.In a Hobbesian analysis, an external enforcer resolves conflict by threatening parties with outcomes worse than non-cooperation.
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    • 2.If the conflicts were coordination games, each side already feared from the other something worse than any external enforcer could threaten.
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    • 3.Therefore, the mere presence of an external enforcer could not have changed the game or the incentive structure.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Coordination games with multiple equilibria require a focal point mechanism, which an external enforcer can uniquely provide through recognized authority.
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    • 2.Schelling's analysis shows that salient third-party interventions reframe expectation structures, shifting which equilibrium actors converge upon.
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    • 3.NATO's credible presence in Yugoslavia demonstrably altered actor expectations, producing the Dayton equilibrium that internal coordination had failed to generate.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The classification of Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts as coordination games rather than Prisoner's Dilemmas is itself empirically contested and theoretically underdetermined.
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    • 2.Wendt and constructivist IR theorists argue that conflict game-structures are not fixed prior to intervention but are constituted through the process of external engagement itself.
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentDemocracy & Governance

    Connections

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    Social Contract1 linkedCausation1 linked

    Related

    Coordination games with multiple equilibria require a focal point mechanism, whi...If the conflicts were coordination games, each side already feared from the othe...In a Hobbesian analysis, an external enforcer resolves conflict by threatening p...NATO's credible presence in Yugoslavia demonstrably altered actor expectations, ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Schelling's analysis shows that salient third-party interventions reframe expect...The classification of Yugoslav and Rwandan conflicts as coordination games rathe...Therefore, the mere presence of an external enforcer could not have changed the ...

    Similar

    In a Hobbesian analysis, an external enforcer resolves conflict by thr...85%If the conflicts were coordination games, each side already feared fro...82%Therefore, the mere presence of an external enforcer could not have ch...82%Hobbesian external enforcement is the appropriate solution for Prisone...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    According to Hardin, neither the Yugoslavian nor the Rwandan disasters were PDs to begin with. That is, in neither situation, on either side, did most people begin by preferring the destruction of the other to mutual cooperation. However, the deadly logic of coordination, deliberately abetted by self-serving politicians, dynamically created PDs. Some individual Serbs (Hutus) were encouraged to perceive their individual interests as best served through identification with Serbian (Hutu) group-int
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Wendt and constructivist IR theorists argue that conflict game-structures are no...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit