An inference to non-mental objects lying behind mental objects could not be supported by enumerative induction, since no non-mental objects are ever observed behind mental objects.
Backed up or justified by evidence or valid reasoning—in other words, there's a good reason to believe it's true.
enumerative induction(Contrasted with the method of hypothesis as a form of ampliative reasoning)
A form of inference in which a general conclusion is drawn from repeated observations of particular cases within experience.
inference(Nyāya epistemology)
A component of epistemology in Nyāya philosophy; a veritable inference yields knowledge about the world and must have premises that are themselves known
Mill calls this insight “one of great weight and significance, which impresses a character on the whole mode of philosophical thinking of whoever receives it” (Examination, IX: 11). The doctrine ultimately pushes Mill towards Idealism. One might hold that, though we are only familiar in experience with mental impressions, we can nevertheless infer the existence of non-mental objects lying behind such mental objects. But such an inference could not be supported within experience by enumerative in