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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Analogical reasoning can provide inductive support within Bayesian epistemology without incurring the logical difficulties of ampliative rules

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Prior probability assignments are not epistemically unconstrained: they must themselves be justified by some rule or principle.
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    • 2.Any principled constraint on priors that is sensitive to analogical similarity constitutes an ampliative rule in disguise.
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    • 3.Van Fraassen's conditionalization objections apply to any diachronic commitment to structured prior-setting, not merely to confirmation rules.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Carnap's inductive logic programs showed that formalizing similarity-based priors inevitably embeds substantive metaphysical assumptions about natural kinds.
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    • 2.Embedding such assumptions into a Bayesian framework does not dissolve the problem of induction but merely relocates it to the prior specification stage.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Analogical reasoning can be directed primarily toward prior probability assignments rather than confirmation
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    • 2.If analogical reasoning operates at the level of priors, it remains formally distinct from confirmation
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    • 3.Van Fraassen's Dutch Book objection targets rule-based confirmation, not prior probability assignments
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