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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Anomalous Monism does not inherit the problem of justifying specific identifications between mental and physical events

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Token identity theory still requires principled criteria for individuating mental events as the same event redescribed physically, not merely correlated.
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    • 2.Davidson's own reliance on supervenience presupposes a systematic covariance that implicitly demands the kind of identifications AM claims to avoid.
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    • 3.Without specifiable identity conditions, AM cannot distinguish genuine token identity from mere parallelism, undermining its monist credential.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jaegwon Kim's causal inheritance argument shows that if mental events cause physical effects only via their physical descriptions, the mental qua mental is causally inert.
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    • 2.A theory that cannot specify which physical event is identical to a given mental event cannot explain why mental causation is not systematically epiphenomenal.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The claim that there is a physical description for each mental event is established purely a priori, not through empirical identification
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    • 2.Physical descriptions are not specifiable in precise and uniquely identifying spatial and temporal terms
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