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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Anomalous Monism does not inherit the problem of justifyi... — Carmelics
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    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Anomalous Monism does not inherit the problem of justifying specific identifications between mental and physical events

    CausationConsciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The claim that there is a physical description for each mental event is established purely a priori, not through empirical identification
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    • 2.Physical descriptions are not specifiable in precise and uniquely identifying spatial and temporal terms
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Token identity theory still requires principled criteria for individuating mental events as the same event redescribed physically, not merely correlated.
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    • 2.Davidson's own reliance on supervenience presupposes a systematic covariance that implicitly demands the kind of identifications AM claims to avoid.
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    • 3.Without specifiable identity conditions, AM cannot distinguish genuine token identity from mere parallelism, undermining its monist credential.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jaegwon Kim's causal inheritance argument shows that if mental events cause physical effects only via their physical descriptions, the mental qua mental is causally inert.
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    • 2.A theory that cannot specify which physical event is identical to a given mental event cannot explain why mental causation is not systematically epiphenomenal.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & MindCausation

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    A theory that cannot specify which physical event is identical to a given mental...Davidson's own reliance on supervenience presupposes a systematic covariance tha...Jaegwon Kim's causal inheritance argument shows that if mental events cause phys...Physical descriptions are not specifiable in precise and uniquely identifying sp...
    +3 moreShow less
    The claim that there is a physical description for each mental event is establis...Token identity theory still requires principled criteria for individuating menta...Without specifiable identity conditions, AM cannot distinguish genuine token ide...

    Similar

    Token-identity between mental and physical events does not require the...87%The claim that there is a physical description for each mental event i...82%The token-identity of mental and physical events is justified by the i...82%What makes a mental event identical to a physical event is that the me...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: anomalous-monism
    View source passageHide passage
    In any case, Anomalous Monism thus does not inherit the problem of how to justify specific identifications between mental and physical events, because the claim that there is a physical description for each mental event is established purely a priori. And the physical descriptions are not (indeed, cannot be) specifiable in precise and uniquely identifying spatial and temporal terms. As we are about to see (5.2), each of these points is overlooked by many of Davidson’s critics. That the latter
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit