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    Anscombe's foundational treatment of intention in 'Intent... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend what one is in a position to settle.

    Anscombe's foundational treatment of intention in 'Intention' (1957) grounds the concept in the agent's practical knowledge of what they are doing, not what others will do.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Agents have direct, non-inferential access to their own intentional actions in a way they lack for others' responses.
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    • 2.Grounding intention in practical knowledge avoids the problem of infinite regress from trying to predict others' behavior.
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    • 3.The first-person perspective on intention is epistemically privileged and should anchor philosophical analysis.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Most human intentions essentially involve expectations about how others will respond to our actions.
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    • 2.Social intentions like promising or commanding logically require beliefs about others' uptake, not just self-knowledge.
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    • 3.Practical knowledge of 'what I'm doing' presupposes background understanding of social norms others share and enforce.
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    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    Agents have direct, non-inferential access to their own intentional actions in a...Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the for...Grounding intention in practical knowledge avoids the problem of infinite regres...Most human intentions essentially involve expectations about how others will res...
    +3 moreShow less
    Practical knowledge of 'what I'm doing' presupposes background understanding of ...Social intentions like promising or commanding logically require beliefs about o...

    Details

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    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    The first-person perspective on intention is epistemically privileged and should...