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    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective becaus... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend what one is in a position to settle.

    Philosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Bratman's own agency-condition requires that intentions settle matters within the agent's own future conduct, not outcomes dependent on others' independent choices.
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    • 2.Another agent's participation in a joint action is not within one's own power to settle unilaterally, as their will remains irreducibly external to one's practical reasoning.
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    • 3.Therefore, 'I intend that we X' smuggles a cooperative outcome into the content of a unilateral mental state, violating the agential scope that makes intention normatively coherent.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Michael Bratman himself concedes in 'Faces of Intention' that intention must be appropriately responsive to the agent's own volitional control over the intended state of affairs.
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    • 2.Anscombe's foundational treatment of intention in 'Intention' (1957) grounds the concept in the agent's practical knowledge of what they are doing, not what others will do.
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    • 3.Intentions whose satisfaction conditions include the independent future agency of others cannot generate the same first-person practical commitments Bratman relies on to explain coordination and meshing subplans.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the intentionality of joint action.
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    • 2.One can only intend what one can take oneself to be in a position to settle.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Key Terms

    Bratman(the philosopher being discussed)
    Michael Bratman is a contemporary philosopher who developed an influential theory about how humans form and act on intentions and plans.
    Intend that we X(the specific form of intention being criticized)
    A way of expressing that you personally commit to doing some action (X) as part of a group effort—the 'we' means you're thinking of the group as a unit you're part of.
    Settle(describing what one can actually intend according to the disputed rule)
    To determine or control something by your own choice or action; what you have the power to make happen yourself.
    defective(Used to distinguish genuine normative failure from mere variation in kind)
    Failing to meet the constitutive standards of the kind to which one belongs; contrasted with merely being 'different.'
    shared intention(Bratman's account of joint action)
    An intention that comes into existence when both agents form intentions of the form 'I intend that we X', with each agent's individual intention understood as partially constitutive of the shared intention.

    Related

    Another agent's participation in a joint action is not within one's own power to...Anscombe's foundational treatment of intention in 'Intention' (1957) grounds the...Bratman treats intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' as basic to the inten...Bratman's own agency-condition requires that intentions settle matters within th...
    +4 moreShow less
    Intentions whose satisfaction conditions include the independent future agency o...Michael Bratman himself concedes in 'Faces of Intention' that intention must be ...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: collective-intentionality
    View source passageHide passage
    Thus, the claim here is that intentions of the form “I intend that we X” are basic to the intentionality of joint action. Critics have argued that Bratman’s account is defective in so far as it treats intentions of that form as basic, since they violate either (1) the condition that one can only intend one’s own action, or (2) the condition that one can only control one’s own and no other agent’s actions, or (3) the condition that one can only intend what one can take to be in a position to sett
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    One can only intend what one can take oneself to be in a position to settle.
    Therefore, 'I intend that we X' smuggles a cooperative outcome into the content ...

    Similar

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    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit