Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Answering the skeptic about epistemic justification requi... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→The rational acceptance of foundational presuppositions must be grounded in epistemic rather than pragmatic gains and losses.

    Answering the skeptic about epistemic justification requires that the acceptance be epistemically — not merely practically — rational.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    If the gains and losses justifying acceptance of presuppositions were pragmatic ...The rational acceptance of foundational presuppositions must be grounded in epis...Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the skeptic abou...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Skepticism
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.

    Similar

    Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the sk...88%Plantinga's A/C model may not by itself be sufficient to explain how a...85%Global skepticism is an unacceptable epistemic outcome83%A concept of justification that applies to beliefs one barely comprehe...83%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: apriori
    View source passageHide passage
    A final view of a priori justification according to which it does not rest on nonexperiential evidence holds that we are entitled to accept certain propositions on no evidence and that entitlement on no grounds or evidence is what a priori justification amounts to. To be entitled to accept, or trust, some presupposition is for it to be rational to accept or trust it, though this is supposed to be different from being justified in believing it. Crispin Wright proposes that the laws of logic and t

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective