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    The rational acceptance of foundational presuppositions m... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    The rational acceptance of foundational presuppositions must be grounded in epistemic rather than pragmatic gains and losses.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.If the gains and losses justifying acceptance of presuppositions were pragmatic (e.g., happiness, prestige, wealth), then acceptance would only be practically rational, not epistemically rational.
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    • 2.Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the skeptic about knowledge and epistemic justification, not merely to serve practical interests.
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    • 3.Answering the skeptic about epistemic justification requires that the acceptance be epistemically — not merely practically — rational.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Peirce and pragmatist epistemology hold that epistemic and pragmatic rationality are not categorically distinct but differ only in the scope of practical consequences considered.
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    • 2.If long-run community inquiry and truth-tracking are themselves practical goals, then grounding presuppositions in these aims is simultaneously pragmatic and epistemically legitimate.
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    • 3.Wright's sharp epistemic/pragmatic distinction therefore relies on a dualism that pragmatist epistemology has historically and systematically dismantled.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' argues that foundational hinge propositions are not justified epistemically at all, but function as the inherited background enabling epistemic practice.
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    • 2.If hinge commitments are constitutively prior to the epistemic/pragmatic distinction, demanding they be grounded in epistemic rather than pragmatic gains commits a category error.
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    • 3.The claim therefore misidentifies the normative structure governing foundational presuppositions by applying justificatory categories that only apply downstream of those very presuppositions.
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    Related

    Answering the skeptic about epistemic justification requires that the acceptance...If hinge commitments are constitutively prior to the epistemic/pragmatic distinc...If long-run community inquiry and truth-tracking are themselves practical goals,...If the gains and losses justifying acceptance of presuppositions were pragmatic ...
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    Peirce and pragmatist epistemology hold that epistemic and pragmatic rationality...The claim therefore misidentifies the normative structure governing foundational...Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' argues that foundational hinge propositions are no...Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the skeptic abou...Wright's sharp epistemic/pragmatic distinction therefore relies on a dualism tha...

    Similar

    If the gains and losses justifying acceptance of presuppositions were ...86%Wright intends rational acceptance of presuppositions to answer the sk...84%Nothing will be lost, and something may be gained epistemically, by ac...83%Those presuppositions are untenable and not grounded in realities.81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: apriori
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    A final view of a priori justification according to which it does not rest on nonexperiential evidence holds that we are entitled to accept certain propositions on no evidence and that entitlement on no grounds or evidence is what a priori justification amounts to. To be entitled to accept, or trust, some presupposition is for it to be rational to accept or trust it, though this is supposed to be different from being justified in believing it. Crispin Wright proposes that the laws of logic and t
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit