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    Appearance properties cannot be named — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Appearance properties cannot be named

    PerceptionPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • Thau's argument for appearance properties commits him to the view that they cannot be named
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Phenomenal concepts like 'the way red looks to me now' function as genuine singular terms that pick out appearance properties directly.
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    • 2.If a term reliably co-refers to a property across uses, it names that property regardless of whether it does so via a descriptive mode of presentation.
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    • 3.Philosophers like Loar and Levine have defended phenomenal concepts as a distinct naming mechanism not reducible to functional or descriptive reference.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's framework allows ostensive definition to fix the reference of a name even when the named item resists descriptive characterization.
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    • 2.An agent can ostensively stipulate 'let A name this very appearance' during an episode of experience, thereby naming an appearance property.
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    • 3.Thau's argument establishes only that appearance properties lack canonical descriptions, not that ostensive baptism fails for them.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

    Related

    An agent can ostensively stipulate 'let A name this very appearance' during an e...If a term reliably co-refers to a property across uses, it names that property r...Kripke's framework allows ostensive definition to fix the reference of a name ev...Phenomenal concepts like 'the way red looks to me now' function as genuine singu...
    +3 moreShow less
    Philosophers like Loar and Levine have defended phenomenal concepts as a distinc...Thau's argument establishes only that appearance properties lack canonical descr...Thau's argument for appearance properties commits him to the view that they cann...

    Similar

    There are no such things as properties80%Thau's argument for appearance properties commits him to the view that...79%Moral properties cannot be known by experience79%Nameability is a universal property, so absence-of-nameability is unin...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: qualia-inverted
    View source passageHide passage
    Thau (2002, Ch. 5) holds a similar view, but there are some important differences. First, Thau’s argument does not turn on the need to secure spectrum inversion without misrepresentation, and instead deploys an adaptation of Jackson’s (1982) thought experiment concerning black-and-white Mary. (See the entry on qualia: the knowledge argument.) Second, because Thau is not concerned to ensure that neither Invert nor Nonvert is misperceiving the tomato, he does not try to argue that the tomato has
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit