Arnauld and later Leibniz pressed that identity of nature requires intersubstitutability in all contexts, but Descartes treats corporeal substance as a substance-bearer while extension functions as an attribute, violating strict identity.
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Leibniz is a German philosopher and mathematician from the 1600s-1700s who developed calculus (a powerful math tool for measuring change and areas) independently around the same time as Isaac Newton. He's famous for creating much of the notation we still use in mathematics today and for arguing that everything in the universe follows logical principles. His ideas profoundly influenced modern science, mathematics, and philosophy, making him one of history's most important thinkers.
Strict identity(in metaphysics and logic)
Perfect, absolute sameness in every way—if two things have strict identity, there is no meaningful difference between them whatsoever.
Substance-bearer(in metaphysics)
Something that 'holds' or 'carries' properties and qualities; like how a table is the substance that bears the properties of being brown, wooden, and four-legged.
attribute(Spinoza's metaphysics, contrasted with Descartes)
That which individuates substances, not merely types of substances; dropped the Cartesian qualifier 'principal' so that all attributes, not just the chief one, are individuating.
corporeal substance(Leibnizian metaphysics of living matter)
A body endowed with a basic entelechy or vital principle, of which it may be said in general that it is living.
extension(Semantics and philosophy of language)
Another term for reference, i.e., the object or set of objects a term picks out
substance(Spinoza's metaphysics; criteria include (i) necessity and (ii) self-subsistence)
The fundamental existent that is wholly necessary and self-subsistent, not depending on anything else for its existence