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    Perspectives
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    42
    Corporeal substance and spatial extension are identical i... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Corporeal substance and spatial extension are identical in nature for Descartes

    Consciousness & Mind
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The same extension that constitutes the nature of body also constitutes the nature of space (Pr II 11)
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    • 2.Body and space differ only as an individual differs from its genus or species
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Descartes distinguishes internal place (the body itself) from external place (surrounding surfaces), implying space and body are conceptually separable (Pr II 13-15).
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    • 2.If corporeal substance and extension were strictly identical, the notion of 'empty space' would be not merely false but conceptually incoherent, yet Descartes argues against the void on physical grounds, not purely definitional ones.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Descartes attributes modes like shape, motion, and divisibility to body but treats these as modifications of extension, suggesting body has a richer ontological profile than bare spatial extension.
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    • 2.Arnauld and later Leibniz pressed that identity of nature requires intersubstitutability in all contexts, but Descartes treats corporeal substance as a substance-bearer while extension functions as an attribute, violating strict identity.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Arnauld and later Leibniz pressed that identity of nature requires intersubstitu...Body and space differ only as an individual differs from its genus or speciesDescartes attributes modes like shape, motion, and divisibility to body but trea...Descartes distinguishes internal place (the body itself) from external place (su...
    +2 moreShow less
    If corporeal substance and extension were strictly identical, the notion of 'emp...The same extension that constitutes the nature of body also constitutes the natu...

    Similar

    That which is not constituted by extension cannot be understood in spa...78%Descartes equates bodily and spatial extension to reject any view trea...77%The same extension that constitutes the nature of body also constitute...77%The essence of res extensa (matter) is extension — i.e., spatial occup...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: descartes-physics
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    Related to the alleged circularity of the definitions of motion and body, as well as the problem of resting bodies, is the difficulty in reconciling Descartes’ definition of “substance” with his claim that individual bodies are substances. If, as Descartes believes, substances are not dependent on other things in order to exist (Pr I 51), then any part of extension (which is a body, via Pr II 10, as explained above) would not qualify as a substance since it depend on its contiguous neighbors to
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit