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    Assumption (1), as interpreted by Rowe, is eminently reas... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
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    Assumption (1), as interpreted by Rowe, is eminently reasonable.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.For any two propositions q and r, if q entails r then Pr(r | q) = 1.
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    • 2.Rowe interprets P in such a way that not-G entails P, since he interprets P as saying that it is not the case that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being together with some known good that justifies that being in allowing E1 and E2.
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    • 3.Since not-G entails P, Pr(P | not-G) = 1, which is what assumption (1) states.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rowe's interpretation of P smuggles in an epistemic limitation by defining P relative to 'known goods', making the entailment trivially true by definitional fiat rather than substantive metaphysical necessity.
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    • 2.A proposition that is made true by definitional construction rather than by the nature of reality cannot serve as a genuinely 'reasonable' empirical premise in an inductive argument against theism.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Stephen Wykstra's CORNEA principle establishes that we can only claim Pr(P | not-G) = 1 if we have sufficient cognitive access to the range of goods an omniscient being could perceive, which we demonstrably lack.
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    • 2.Given the vast disproportion between human and divine cognition, our inability to identify a justifying good for E1 and E2 provides negligible evidential support that no such good exists, undermining the 'eminently reasonable' characterization.
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    Problem of Evil

    Related

    A proposition that is made true by definitional construction rather than by the ...For any two propositions q and r, if q entails r then Pr(r | q) = 1.Given the vast disproportion between human and divine cognition, our inability t...Rowe interprets P in such a way that not-G entails P, since he interprets P as s...
    +3 moreShow less
    Rowe's interpretation of P smuggles in an epistemic limitation by defining P rel...Since not-G entails P, Pr(P | not-G) = 1, which is what assumption (1) states.Stephen Wykstra's CORNEA principle establishes that we can only claim Pr(P | not...

    Similar

    The logic of Rowe's argument is impeccable.76%Premise (3) is plausible.74%Therefore, it is not obvious that HI is logically incompatible with th...74%Rowe interprets P in such a way that not-G entails P, since he interpr...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
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    Fourthly, all three assumptions, interpreted as Rowe does, are surely eminently reasonable. As regards (1), it follows from the fact that for any two propositions \(q\) and \(r\), if \(q\) entails \(r\) then \(\Pr(r \mid q) = 1\), together with the fact that Rowe interprets \(P\) in such a way that \(\negt G\) entails \(P\), since he interprets \(P\) as saying that it is not the case that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being together with some known good that justifies that being in allowing \(E_1\) and \(E_2\).

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit