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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    42
    Premise (3) is plausible. — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Premise (3) is plausible.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Pr(P | G & k) can be equal to one only if the conjunction ¬P & G & k is necessarily false.
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    • 2.The conjunction ¬P & G & k is necessarily false only if either ¬P is necessarily false or the conjunction G & k entails P.
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    • 3.Neither ¬P is necessarily false nor does G & k entail P.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.On Leibnizian optimalism, God's perfect rationality and goodness necessitate actualizing the best possible world, which may logically require evils as constitutive goods.
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    • 2.If evil is a logically necessary component of the best achievable world, then G & k does entail P, contra P3.
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    • 3.Swinburne's soul-making theodicy grounds this: a world with genuine moral development is better than one without, and such development metaphysically requires the possibility of suffering.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Alvin Plantinga's free will defense shows G & k may metaphysically entail P if creaturely freedom requires the possibility of moral evil.
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    • 2.If possible worlds where God creates free creatures necessarily include worlds with evil, then ¬P & G & k is impossible, falsifying P3.
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    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Related

    Alvin Plantinga's free will defense shows G & k may metaphysically entail P if c...If evil is a logically necessary component of the best achievable world, then G ...If possible worlds where God creates free creatures necessarily include worlds w...Neither ¬P is necessarily false nor does G & k entail P.
    +5 moreShow less
    On Leibnizian optimalism, God's perfect rationality and goodness necessitate act...Only necessarily false propositions have a probability equal to zero.Pr(P | G & k) can be equal to one only if the conjunction ¬P & G & k is necessar...Swinburne's soul-making theodicy grounds this: a world with genuine moral develo...The conjunction ¬P & G & k is necessarily false only if either ¬P is necessarily...

    Similar

    Assumptions (1), (2), and (3) are plausible.93%Theism is very probably false, even when the evidence for God's existe...76%Assumption (1), as interpreted by Rowe, is eminently reasonable.74%It is unlikely that God exists.74%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    When the argument from evil is formulated in this way, it involves five premises, set out at steps (1), (3), (5), (7) and (9). Statement (1) involves both empirical claims, and moral claims, but the empirical claims are surely true, and, setting aside the question of the existence of objective rightmaking and wrongmaking properties, the moral claims are surely also very plausible. The other four premises, set out at steps (3), (5), (7) and (9), are plausibly viewed as analytic truths.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit