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    Attributes, not modes, must be the individuating principl... — Carmelics
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    Attributes, not modes, must be the individuating principle for substances.

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Any two substances must be distinguished either by their attributes or by their modes.
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    • 2.Modes are ontologically and causally dependent on the substances of which they are affections.
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    • 3.Because modes depend on substances, modes cannot serve as the individuating principle for substances.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Modes can individuate substances if they constitute a unique, non-transferable bundle that no other substance could possess, as bundle theorists like Hume suggest.
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    • 2.If substance identity is grounded in the totality of its modes rather than any single mode, the dependence relation does not preclude individuation by modes collectively.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles entails that two substances sharing all attributes would still be distinct if they differ in relational or positional modes.
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    • 2.If attributes alone individuate substances, then two numerically distinct substances cannot share an attribute, yet Spinoza's own system allows finite modes of one attribute to be genuinely distinct, undermining attribute-based individuation as a general principle.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Connections

    2 topics

    Causation2 linkedDivine Attributes1 linked

    Related

    Any two substances must be distinguished either by their attributes or by their ...Because modes depend on substances, modes cannot serve as the individuating prin...If attributes alone individuate substances, then two numerically distinct substa...If substance identity is grounded in the totality of its modes rather than any s...
    +3 moreShow less
    Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles entails that two substance...Modes are ontologically and causally dependent on the substances of which they a...Modes can individuate substances if they constitute a unique, non-transferable b...

    Similar

    Because modes depend on substances, modes cannot serve as the individu...94%Any two substances must be distinguished either by their attributes or...81%Real Cartesian individuation implies real distinction and the existenc...80%A real substance must have a complete concept that affords a principle...79%

    Source

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    SEP: continental-rationalism
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    Spinoza arrived at this position by way of a decidedly uncartesian account of attributes. While Descartes held that two substances of the same type can share the same principal attribute, Spinoza rejected this. Any two substances, argued Spinoza, must be distinguished either by their attributes (Spinoza dropped the modifier “principal”) or by their modes. But, since modes are themselves both ontologically and causally dependent on the substances of which they are affections, they cannot be the i
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit