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Aumann's original formalization of common knowledge of ra... — Carmelics

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Challenges→The single-state epistemic-probability model assigning profile (u, l) does not satisfy common knowledge of rationality in the relevant sense.

Aumann's original formalization of common knowledge of rationality in 'Agreeing to Disagree' (1976) does not impose caution as a necessary condition on belief profiles.

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Reasons For

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Reason for

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1.Aumann's model uses event partitions representing agents' information, which only require rationality (maximizing expected utility given beliefs), not caution.
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2.The 'Agreeing to Disagree' theorem derives disagreement from differences in information partitions alone, without imposing additional prudential constraints.
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3.Caution is a substantive epistemic norm beyond rationality; adding it would strengthen the model's assumptions beyond what Aumann explicitly formalized.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

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1.Common knowledge of rationality implicitly requires agents assign positive probability only to rational scenarios; this excludes reckless belief formations.
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2.Mutual knowledge of rationality creates incentive structures that make cavalier or imprudent beliefs self-undermining, functioning as a practical caution requirement.
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3.Without some caution principle, the common knowledge assumption becomes epistemically fragile and prone to coordination failures Aumann's framework actually prevents.
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Key Terms

knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.): Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

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2 topics

Truth & Knowledge1 linked Skepticism1 linked

Related

Aumann's model uses event partitions representing agents' information, which onl...Caution is a substantive epistemic norm beyond rationality; adding it would stre...Common knowledge of rationality implicitly requires agents assign positive proba...Mutual knowledge of rationality creates incentive structures that make cavalier ...

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The 'Agreeing to Disagree' theorem derives disagreement from differences in info...The single-state epistemic-probability model assigning profile (u, l) does not s...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit

Without some caution principle, the common knowledge assumption becomes epistemi...