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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Aumann's original formalization of common knowledge of rationality in 'Agreeing to Disagree' (1976) does not impose caution as a necessary condition on belief profiles.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Common knowledge of rationality implicitly requires agents assign positive probability only to rational scenarios; this excludes reckless belief formations.
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    • 2.Mutual knowledge of rationality creates incentive structures that make cavalier or imprudent beliefs self-undermining, functioning as a practical caution requirement.
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    • 3.Without some caution principle, the common knowledge assumption becomes epistemically fragile and prone to coordination failures Aumann's framework actually prevents.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Aumann's model uses event partitions representing agents' information, which only require rationality (maximizing expected utility given beliefs), not caution.
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    • 2.The 'Agreeing to Disagree' theorem derives disagreement from differences in information partitions alone, without imposing additional prudential constraints.
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    • 3.Caution is a substantive epistemic norm beyond rationality; adding it would strengthen the model's assumptions beyond what Aumann explicitly formalized.
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