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    Barrett's Conceptual Act View prevents infants and non-hu... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    Barrett's Conceptual Act View prevents infants and non-human animals from having emotions

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Barrett explicitly defines emotions as 'conceptual acts' requiring linguistic and cultural scaffolding unavailable to pre-linguistic organisms.
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    • 2.Conceptual scaffolding in Barrett's framework is constitutive of emotion, not merely causally upstream from it, making language a necessary condition.
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    • 3.Infants and non-human animals lack the culturally transmitted emotion concepts Barrett identifies as the very medium through which affective states become emotions.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Sellars' 'Myth of the Given' supports Barrett's denial that raw affective states carry intrinsic emotional content without conceptual mediation.
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    • 2.If emotional experience requires the kind of norm-governed conceptual space Sellars and Barrett invoke, then organisms outside that space have only proto-emotional affect, not emotions proper.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.On Barrett's view, having an emotion requires categorizing a core affective state under an emotion concept
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    • 2.Infants and non-human animals lack the conceptual repertoire required to perform such categorization
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    • 3.Therefore infants and non-human animals cannot have emotions on this view
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Related

    Barrett explicitly defines emotions as 'conceptual acts' requiring linguistic an...Conceptual scaffolding in Barrett's framework is constitutive of emotion, not me...If emotional experience requires the kind of norm-governed conceptual space Sell...Infants and non-human animals lack the conceptual repertoire required to perform...
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    Infants and non-human animals lack the culturally transmitted emotion concepts B...On Barrett's view, having an emotion requires categorizing a core affective stat...Sellars' 'Myth of the Given' supports Barrett's denial that raw affective states...Therefore infants and non-human animals cannot have emotions on this view

    Similar

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: emotion
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    Different constructionists describe the way in which emotions are built out of core affect and other ingredients in different ways. For example, in Barrett’s influential Conceptual Act View, conceptualization plays a key role (Barrett 2006, 2013, 2017; Barrett & Satpute 2013). Being afraid amounts to categorizing a core affective state of high arousal and high displeasure under the “fear” concept. Being happy amounts to categorizing a core affective state of high arousal and high pleasure un
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit