Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Because pain and its phenomenal character are identical b... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→The conceivability argument does not definitively refute all reasons for believing in mind-body dependence.

    Because pain and its phenomenal character are identical by rigid designation if at all, there is no analogous 'appearance of contingency' to explain away, undermining posteriori identity defenses.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Rigid designators pick out the same entity in all possible worlds, so pain and C-fibers cannot be contingently identical.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The appearance of contingency in water/H2O cases arises from descriptivist confusions about meaning, not metaphysical reality.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If pain and neural states are genuinely identical, denying this via 'appearance of contingency' merely postpones the explanatory burden.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The epistemic gap between first-person phenomenal properties and third-person physical properties persists even with rigid designation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Pain's intrinsic qualitative character seems conceptually distinct from any physical property in ways water and H2O are not.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Rigid designation solves reference, not the metaphysical puzzle of why physical processes should necessitate subjective experience.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Key Terms

    Appearance of contingency(metaphysics)
    The seeming possibility that something could have been otherwise—for example, pain might seem like it could have been something other than what it is.
    Contingency(as a value Leibniz wanted to preserve)
    The quality of something being possible but not necessary—it could be different than it is, or might not happen at all.
    Identity (philosophical)(as used in metaphysics and logic)
    When two things are actually the same thing, not just similar—like how Clark Kent and Superman are identical (the same person with two names).
    a posteriori(Used to classify the epistemic status of necessary statements post-Kripke)
    Knowable, but not independently of empirical experience
    a posteriori identity(Philosophy of science and metaethics; contrasted with a priori identities)
    An identity claim that is established through empirical investigation rather than conceptual or logical analysis alone.
    phenomenal character(Used to distinguish the mere presence of experience from the specific qualitative nature of individual experiences)
    The qualitative, subjective 'what it is like' aspect of mental states; the property of having qualia
    rigid designation(Illustrated by the indexical 'I', which rigidly designates the speaker of the context even when evaluated at counterfactual circumstances)
    An expression rigidly designates when, uttered in a fixed context, it refers to the same entity across all circumstances of evaluation

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consciousness & Mind1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    If pain and neural states are genuinely identical, denying this via 'appearance ...Pain's intrinsic qualitative character seems conceptually distinct from any phys...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Rigid designation solves reference, not the metaphysical puzzle of why physical ...
    Rigid designators pick out the same entity in all possible worlds, so pain and C...
    +3 moreShow less
    The appearance of contingency in water/H2O cases arises from descriptivist confu...The conceivability argument does not definitively refute all reasons for believi...The epistemic gap between first-person phenomenal properties and third-person ph...