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    The conceivability argument does not definitively refute ... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    The conceivability argument does not definitively refute all reasons for believing in mind-body dependence.

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Many concepts in the philosophy of mind remain contested.
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    • 2.There may be other reasons for believing in mind-body dependence beyond those addressed by the conceivability argument.
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    • 3.The conceivability argument does not pre-empt claims about dependence as they arise.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chalmers' conceivability argument establishes that zombies are ideally conceivable, which entails metaphysical possibility by the modal logic S5.
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    • 2.If a world without phenomenal consciousness but with identical physical structure is metaphysically possible, then consciousness cannot be logically entailed by physical states.
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    • 3.Any purported reason for mind-body dependence that conflicts with this modal result must either deny S5 or show ideal conceivability fails, not merely invoke contested concepts.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's argument in Naming and Necessity demonstrates that apparent contingency between mental and physical states cannot be explained away as mere epistemic illusion, unlike the heat-molecular motion case.
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    • 2.Because pain and its phenomenal character are identical by rigid designation if at all, there is no analogous 'appearance of contingency' to explain away, undermining posteriori identity defenses.
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    • 3.Therefore, the conceivability argument's force against mind-body dependence is not merely one consideration among others but exposes a structural disanalogy that defeats the most sophisticated identity-theoretic responses.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

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    Skepticism1 linked

    Related

    Any purported reason for mind-body dependence that conflicts with this modal res...Because pain and its phenomenal character are identical by rigid designation if ...Chalmers' conceivability argument establishes that zombies are ideally conceivab...If a world without phenomenal consciousness but with identical physical structur...
    +5 moreShow less
    Kripke's argument in Naming and Necessity demonstrates that apparent contingency...Many concepts in the philosophy of mind remain contested.The conceivability argument does not pre-empt claims about dependence as they ar...There may be other reasons for believing in mind-body dependence beyond those ad...Therefore, the conceivability argument's force against mind-body dependence is n...

    Similar

    There may be other reasons for believing in mind-body dependence beyon...96%The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case against stronge...95%The conceivability argument does not pre-empt claims about dependence ...89%The conceivability argument and the knowledge argument pose serious ch...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: dualism
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    Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit