Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Because the agent has no more reason to choose one altern... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→No choice between incomparable bearers of value is intelligible in the ways suggested by Raz or Finnis.

    Because the agent has no more reason to choose one alternative over another initially, the reasons grounding the agent's wants must only become available after the initially relevant reasons are exhausted.

    Free Will & ForeknowledgeMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityFree Will & Foreknowledge

    Key Terms

    agent(Economics terminology applied to medical ethics)
    The party in a principal-agent relationship who is instructed to produce the good or service on the principal's behalf — in the medical context, the doctor
    grounding(Drawn from contemporary metaphysics; proposed as potentially applicable to understanding the foundations of legality.)
    A metaphysical relation in which some entities or facts are more foundational than others, providing a hierarchical structure of the world.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    reasons(in philosophy of action)
    Factors or considerations that motivate or justify a choice or belief.
    wants(in philosophy of mind and action)
    Desires or preferences that a person has; what they wish to have or do.

    Connections

    3 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedConsequentialism1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    It is implausible that reasons grounding an agent's wants become available only ...No choice between incomparable bearers of value is intelligible in the ways sugg...Unless grounded in an adequate reason, a decision to go one way rather than anot...When an agent has no more reason to choose one alternative over another, the cho...

    Similar

    It is implausible that reasons grounding an agent's wants become avail...92%When an agent has no more reason to choose one alternative over anothe...89%Therefore, the requirement that the agent comes to want more to act on...84%For an agent to have a reason, the agent must know or believe the cons...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: value-incommensurable
    View source passageHide passage
    Donald Regan challenges this view. According to Regan, unless grounded in an adequate reason, “a decision to go one way rather than another will be something that happened to the agent rather than something she did” and hence be unintelligible to the agent herself (1997, 144). Suppose the agent has no more reason to choose one alternative over another and the choice, as suggested above, is settled by her wants. On Regan’s view, if the agent’s choice is to be intelligible to her, her wants must b

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective