Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Being charmed by an option is not the same as valuing tha... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→The charm-based explanation of akrasia does not require value pluralism and is available to monists as well.

    Being charmed by an option is not the same as valuing that option.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Related

    A monist hedonist agent can know that one option is more pleasurable (cognitive ...The charm-based explanation of akrasia does not require value pluralism and is a...Therefore, a monist account can invoke the same cognitive/affective distinction ...

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Wiggins's explanation of akrasia relies on a distinction between the cognitive a...

    Similar

    If there is no relevant difference between options except that one is ...73%Pleasure is not the true or ultimate measure of choice-worthiness71%There is a distinction between the cognitive element of a choice (know...71%The values at stake in a choice situation cannot on their own determin...70%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: value-pluralism
    View source passageHide passage
    Both Martha Nussbaum (1986) and David Wiggins (1980) have argued for pluralism on the grounds that only pluralism can explain akrasia, or weakness of will. An agent is said to suffer from weakness of will when she knowingly chooses a less good option over a better one. On the face of it, this is a puzzling thing to do—why would someone knowingly do what they know to be worse? A pluralist has a plausible answer—when the choice is between two different sorts of value, the agent is preferring A to

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective