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    Pleasure is not the true or ultimate measure of choice-wo... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
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    Pleasure is not the true or ultimate measure of choice-worthiness

    ConsequentialismVirtue Ethics
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

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    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Shaftesbury argues that moral sense perceives the fittingness of actions independently of their hedonic consequences.
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    • 2.If pleasure were the ultimate measure, virtuous action under suffering would be paradoxically choice-unworthy, contradicting our clearest moral intuitions.
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    • 3.The affections directed toward public good retain their moral worth even when they yield no personal pleasure, as Shaftesbury's account of natural affection demonstrates.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's distinction between hedone and eudaimonia establishes that a flourishing life requires excellences whose value is not reducible to felt satisfaction.
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    • 2.Robert Nozick's experience machine argument shows that rational agents consistently prefer real virtuous engagement over maximally pleasurable simulations.
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    • 3.Therefore, choice-worthiness tracks objective features of actions and character—such as virtue, integrity, and genuine relationship—that pleasure merely accompanies but does not constitute.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.We judge which pleasures are and are not worth pursuing
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    • 2.The standard for evaluating pleasures must be external to pleasure itself
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsConsequentialism

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge1 linked

    Related

    Aristotle's distinction between hedone and eudaimonia establishes that a flouris...If pleasure were the ultimate measure, virtuous action under suffering would be ...Robert Nozick's experience machine argument shows that rational agents consisten...Shaftesbury argues that moral sense perceives the fittingness of actions indepen...
    +4 moreShow less
    The affections directed toward public good retain their moral worth even when th...The standard for evaluating pleasures must be external to pleasure itselfTherefore, choice-worthiness tracks objective features of actions and character—...We judge which pleasures are and are not worth pursuing

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    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: shaftesbury
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    There are, however, numerous other places in Chararacteristicks where Shaftesbury explicitly rejects that pleasure is the true or ultimate measure of choice-worthiness. He ridicules those who “rate Life by the Number of Exquisiteness of the pleasing Sensations” (C 1.123). He holds that the truly virtuous person has a non-negotiable commitment to virtue that defies hedonistic weighing (C 1.129–30, 1.133, 1.261–2). He dismisses as absurd the proverb “That Tastes are different, and must not be disp
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit