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    Being dead is not an experience and does not make a perso... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
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    Supports→Being dead is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for a person (on Epicurus's assumptions).

    Being dead is not an experience and does not make a person have any experiences.

    Afterlife & Death
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    Afterlife & Death

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    Being dead is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for a person (on Epicu...On Epicurus's assumptions, only experiences can be intrinsically or extrinsicall...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    82%
    A person's death does not cause her to have any experiences (sensation...80%
    Being dead is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for a person...79%
    A person may experience her death, but the death itself is distinct fr...77%

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    Epicurus (341–270) adopted a version of hedonism according to which pleasure (or pleasant experiences) is the only thing that is intrinsically good for us (that is, the only thing that is good for us in itself), while pain (or painful experiences) is the only thing that is intrinsically bad for us, bad in itself. Call this view intrinsic hedonism. (For a discussion of intrinsic value, see the entry on Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value.) Epicurus’s commitment to intrinsic hedonism prompted him to say, in his Letter to Menoeceus, that “everything good and bad lies in sensation.” He also claimed, in ...

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