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    Block and Fodor's inference from the conceptual coherence... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    Block and Fodor's inference from the conceptual coherence of the qualia inversion scenario to its possibility is questionable

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's work on necessary a posteriori truths shows conceptual coherence of 'water is not H2O' does not entail its possibility.
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    • 2.Phenomenal concepts like 'inverted qualia' may pick out physical states rigidly, making inversion scenarios coherent but impossible.
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    • 3.If phenomenal terms are rigid designators of functional-physical states, their apparent conceivability reflects epistemic, not metaphysical, gaps.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chalmers' own two-dimensional semantics distinguishes primary from secondary intensions, allowing coherence without metaphysical possibility.
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    • 2.Block and Fodor conflate primary-intension coherence with secondary-intension possibility, a distinction Chalmers' framework explicitly prohibits.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The move from conceptual coherence to possibility is not logically valid
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    • 2.A proposition can be conceptually coherent yet metaphysically impossible
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    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

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    Related

    A proposition can be conceptually coherent yet metaphysically impossibleBlock and Fodor conflate primary-intension coherence with secondary-intension po...Chalmers' own two-dimensional semantics distinguishes primary from secondary int...If phenomenal terms are rigid designators of functional-physical states, their a...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kripke's work on necessary a posteriori truths shows conceptual coherence of 'wa...Phenomenal concepts like 'inverted qualia' may pick out physical states rigidly,...The move from conceptual coherence to possibility is not logically valid

    Similar

    Philosophical arguments that appeal to qualia inversion scenarios can ...85%Many philosophical arguments relying on inversion scenarios can make d...84%Both the inverted qualia and fading qualia strategies are misguided79%If the inverted spectrum hypothesis is correct, then qualia do not sup...78%

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    SEP: qualia-inverted
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    Block and Fodor’s apparent move from the “conceptual coherence” of the inversion scenario to its possibility can be questioned. Even though one cannot know a priori that not-p (that is, p is conceptually coherent), p may yet be impossible. For example, one cannot know a priori that gold does not have the atomic number 79, but it is a necessary truth that gold has this atomic number. (This sort of separation between conceptual coherence and possibility is not uncontroversial, but is commonly acc
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit