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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that directly refer to physical-functional states, so no new ontological property is introduced by the new concept.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.If phenomenal concepts truly refer to physical-functional states directly, their intrinsic qualitative character should be deducible from physical facts—but it isn't.
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    • 2.Recognitional concepts typically depend on intrinsic properties of their targets, yet phenomenal properties seem to resist reduction to functional roles.
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    • 3.The conceivability of zombies (physically identical beings lacking consciousness) suggests phenomenal concepts access something beyond physical-functional properties.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Recognitional concepts can pick out physical states without requiring new ontological categories, just new ways of accessing them.
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    • 2.The apparent explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties dissolves when we understand concepts as modes of presentation, not hidden properties.
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    • 3.Parsimony favors theories avoiding multiply realizability problems by treating phenomenal concepts as identifying physical-functional states directly.
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