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    Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are ... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→There must be a difference in the world between the properties that the old and new concepts of color experience stand for or denote.

    Brian Loar and others argue that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that directly refer to physical-functional states, so no new ontological property is introduced by the new concept.

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    Reasons For

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    Reason for
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    • 1.Recognitional concepts can pick out physical states without requiring new ontological categories, just new ways of accessing them.
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    • 2.The apparent explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties dissolves when we understand concepts as modes of presentation, not hidden properties.
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    • 3.Parsimony favors theories avoiding multiply realizability problems by treating phenomenal concepts as identifying physical-functional states directly.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.If phenomenal concepts truly refer to physical-functional states directly, their intrinsic qualitative character should be deducible from physical facts—but it isn't.
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    • 2.Recognitional concepts typically depend on intrinsic properties of their targets, yet phenomenal properties seem to resist reduction to functional roles.
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    • 3.The conceivability of zombies (physically identical beings lacking consciousness) suggests phenomenal concepts access something beyond physical-functional properties.
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    Key Terms

    Brian Loar(as the originator of the phenomenal concepts strategy)
    A philosopher who developed an influential theory about how we think about consciousness and the physical brain. He argued that we can use two completely different ways of thinking about the same thing without it meaning they're actually different things.
    Ontological property(in metaphysics and philosophy of mind)
    A real, fundamental thing or characteristic that exists in the world; in this context, whether consciousness is something completely separate from the physical brain or just part of it.
    Physical-functional states(in philosophy of mind)
    The physical activities happening in the brain and body that enable it to do what it does—like neurons firing and chemicals interacting—viewed as a system performing specific functions.
    phenomenal concepts(Contrasted with physical concepts, which are theoretical (Loar 1999))
    Recognitional concepts that express the very properties they pick out.
    recognitional concepts(Constraint on the formulation of plans in Gibbard's framework)
    Concepts that individuate circumstances of action in a way that makes descriptively identical situations indistinguishable for purposes of planning

    Connections

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    If phenomenal concepts truly refer to physical-functional states directly, their...Parsimony favors theories avoiding multiply realizability problems by treating p...Recognitional concepts can pick out physical states without requiring new ontolo...Recognitional concepts typically depend on intrinsic properties of their targets...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    +3 moreShow less
    The apparent explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal properties dissolve...The conceivability of zombies (physically identical beings lacking consciousness...There must be a difference in the world between the properties that the old and ...