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    By conforming to the categorical and hypothetical imperat... — Carmelics
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    By conforming to the categorical and hypothetical imperatives, a rational agent makes itself into an agent.

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Some objects make themselves into the kind of objects they are by conforming to their constitutive standards (the self-constitution requirement).
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    • 2.Rational agents are objects of this self-constituting kind.
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    • 3.The categorical and hypothetical imperatives are the constitutive standards of rational agency.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Agency is constituted by causal history and embodied dispositions, not conformity to formal imperatives (Aristotle, NE II.1; Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy').
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    • 2.A being can satisfy the categorical imperative on a single occasion without thereby becoming an agent, revealing that conformity is at most a symptom, not a constitutive condition.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Christine Korsgaard's self-constitution thesis presupposes a unified self that persists across actions, but Parfitian reductionism denies any such metaphysically robust self to be constituted.
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    • 2.If personal identity reduces to psychological continuity without a further fact (Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' §15), then 'making oneself into an agent' names no determinate process over and above the occurrence of rational episodes.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityVirtue Ethics

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPersonal Identity1 linked

    Related

    A being can satisfy the categorical imperative on a single occasion without ther...Agency is constituted by causal history and embodied dispositions, not conformit...Christine Korsgaard's self-constitution thesis presupposes a unified self that p...If personal identity reduces to psychological continuity without a further fact ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Rational agents are objects of this self-constituting kind.Some objects make themselves into the kind of objects they are by conforming to ...The categorical and hypothetical imperatives are the constitutive standards of r...

    Similar

    Rationality requires conformity to hypothetical imperatives, so ration...85%Kantian rationality, as a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma, requires...84%The categorical and hypothetical imperatives are the constitutive stan...83%Yet the agent in this scenario is wholly rational — there is no irrati...83%

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    SEP: constructivism-metaethics
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    However, according to Korsgaard “there need be no such regress if there are principles that are constitutive of the very rational activities that we trying to perform” (2008: 5, 1996b: 164–67, 2009) In this formulation, the principles of practical rationality are constitutive of rational agency, in the sense that they are standards arising from and justified by the nature of the object in question (i.e., the rational agent). More specifically, unless the object conforms to the standard, it cease
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit