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    C.D. Broad's argument from hallucination establishes that... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The statement 'I have a green sense datum' is not a report of an inner object but is a way of saying that one sees or seems to see something that really is green

    C.D. Broad's argument from hallucination establishes that the intrinsic character of perceptual experience requires an internal object of awareness, not a relation to the world.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Hallucinations are phenomenologically indistinguishable from veridical perceptions, yet hallucinations lack external objects.
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    • 2.If hallucinations and perceptions share identical intrinsic character but differ only in external relations, intrinsic character cannot depend on those relations.
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    • 3.The best explanation for why hallucinations feel exactly like perceptions is that both involve awareness of internal representational objects.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Hallucinations may be intrinsically different from veridical perceptions in ways we cannot access through phenomenology alone.
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    • 2.Relational properties can be intrinsic to experience without requiring a separate internal object—the mind-world relation itself constitutes experience.
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    • 3.Postulating internal objects creates explanatory problems (infinite regress, duplication) that exceed the problems it solves.
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    Connections

    2 topics

    Perception1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Hallucinations are phenomenologically indistinguishable from veridical perceptio...Hallucinations may be intrinsically different from veridical perceptions in ways...If hallucinations and perceptions share identical intrinsic character but differ...Postulating internal objects creates explanatory problems (infinite regress, dup...
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    Relational properties can be intrinsic to experience without requiring a separat...The best explanation for why hallucinations feel exactly like perceptions is tha...The statement 'I have a green sense datum' is not a report of an inner object bu...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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