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    The statement 'I have a green sense datum' is not a repor... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The statement 'I have a green sense datum' is not a report of an inner object but is a way of saying that one sees or seems to see something that really is green

    PerceptionPhilosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Sense data are not part of the furniture of the world
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    • 2.Sense-datum language can be paraphrased into language about perceiving external objects
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Hallucinatory experiences involve qualitative character that cannot be cashed out in terms of external objects that may not exist.
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    • 2.If 'I have a green sense datum' merely reports seeming-to-see something green, it cannot account for cases where no external green object is causally involved.
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    • 3.C.D. Broad's argument from hallucination establishes that the intrinsic character of perceptual experience requires an internal object of awareness, not a relation to the world.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frank Jackson's knowledge argument shows that Mary learns a new qualitative fact upon seeing red, irreducible to any relational or dispositional claim about external objects.
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    • 2.If sense-datum reports were merely disguised reports about external objects, acquiring color experience would add no new knowledge beyond physical facts already known.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguagePerception

    Connections

    1 topic

    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    C.D. Broad's argument from hallucination establishes that the intrinsic characte...Frank Jackson's knowledge argument shows that Mary learns a new qualitative fact...Hallucinatory experiences involve qualitative character that cannot be cashed ou...If 'I have a green sense datum' merely reports seeming-to-see something green, i...
    +3 moreShow less
    If sense-datum reports were merely disguised reports about external objects, acq...Sense data are not part of the furniture of the worldSense-datum language can be paraphrased into language about perceiving external ...

    Similar

    The intuition to be captured is that meaning green by "green" obligate...81%Meaning statements like "'Green' means green" are true in virtue of th...78%It is not an objection to meaning-engendered (ME) normativity that the...77%The wide scope reading implies a more disjunctive obligation: S ought ...76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: mind-identity
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    Suppose that I have a yellow, green and purple striped mental image. We may also introduce the philosophical term ‘sense datum’ to cover the case of seeing or seeming to see something yellow, green and purple: we say that we have a yellow, green and purple sense datum. That is I would see or seem to see, for example, a flag or an array of lamps which is green, yellow and purple striped. Suppose also, as seems plausible, that there is nothing yellow, green and purple striped in the brain. Thus it
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit