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    Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra argues that ultimate truth... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Dharmadhātu is completely devoid of evil and virtue.

    Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra argues that ultimate truth is not a positively characterizable entity but the absence of inherent existence, making 'Dharmadhātu' a nominalist placeholder rather than a substantive ground.

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    1 reason for
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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Candrakīrti explicitly rejects svabhāva (intrinsic nature) as incoherent, making positive characterization of ultimate truth self-refuting.
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    • 2.Dharmadhātu functions pragmatically in his system as a conventional linguistic tool, not a metaphysical entity with independent existence.
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    • 3.The Madhyamakāvatāra's two-truths framework requires ultimate truth to lack determinate properties to avoid conceptual proliferation.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Candrakīrti identifies Dharmadhātu with śūnyatā itself, suggesting a substantive (if non-intrinsic) nature, not mere nominalism.
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    • 2.Calling śūnyatā a 'placeholder' risks reducing it to linguistic convention, contradicting Candrakīrti's claim that emptiness is ultimately real.
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    • 3.The negation of inherent existence still posits something determinate—the absence itself—undermining claims of complete non-characterizability.
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    Key Terms

    Candrakīrti(as the main philosopher being discussed)
    An Indian Buddhist philosopher from around the 600s CE who wrote detailed commentaries on Buddhist logic and metaphysics, particularly focusing on the idea that nothing has a permanent, independent essence.
    Dharmadhātu(Contrasted with the conditioned realm of karma; literally 'inconsequential' in that it has no consequences.)
    The Realm of Reality; the unconditioned, actionless ultimate reality that produces no causal results.
    Inherent existence(as the thing being denied in ultimate reality)
    The idea that things have a fixed, independent, unchanging essence or nature all by themselves—a concept Buddhist philosophers argue against.
    Madhyamakāvatāra(as the specific text being referenced)
    The title of Candrakīrti's famous book, which means 'Introduction to the Middle Way'—it's a guide to a Buddhist philosophical school that avoids extreme positions.
    Placeholder(describing the status of Dharmadhātu in Candrakīrti's philosophy)
    A temporary stand-in or label used for convenience that doesn't claim to represent something real or substantial.
    nominalism(Metaphysics; opposed to realism about universals)
    The view that abstract entities such as properties or universals do not exist, and that predicative facts must be explained without appealing to such entities.
    ultimate truth(Candrakīrti's Mādhyamika framework distinguishing two levels of truth)
    Truth concerning the highest goal; specifically, that phenomena do not come into being.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Natural Theology1 linkedDivine Attributes1 linked

    Related

    Calling śūnyatā a 'placeholder' risks reducing it to linguistic convention, cont...Candrakīrti explicitly rejects svabhāva (intrinsic nature) as incoherent, making...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Candrakīrti identifies Dharmadhātu with śūnyatā itself, suggesting a substantive...
    Dharmadhātu functions pragmatically in his system as a conventional linguistic t...
    +3 moreShow less
    The Dharmadhātu is completely devoid of evil and virtue.The Madhyamakāvatāra's two-truths framework requires ultimate truth to lack dete...The negation of inherent existence still posits something determinate—the absenc...